Mobilization and Vote-Buying in Non- Metropolitan County Council Speaker Elections: A Case Study of Shanhai County

Volume: 

30

Number: 

1

Published date: 

六月, 2026

Authors: 

Chin-En Wu
Ying-Jun Jian

Abstract: 

Although a substantial body of research has examined councilor elections and vote buying, relatively little attention has been paid to speaker elections. Using the council speaker elections in Shanhai County as a case, this research seeks to address this gap. Theoretically, the study investigates how local-level party factors—including the absence of intraparty factions and the structure of the party system, particularly the distribution of party seats and the degree of interparty cooperation—shape electoral mobilization and vote-buying practices. The analysis draws primarily on electoral data and field interviews, supplemented by judicial documents. The findings indicate that many councilors incur significant financial deficits during their election campaigns, making speaker-election handouts an important source of financial compensation. This environment enables councilors with greater economic resources to use financial incentives as a means of political mobilization. Regarding the operation of vote buying, changes in the party system influence both the potential targets of mobilization and the forms of cooperation available to speaker candidates. In recent years, increasing partisan polarization and a growing number of independent councilors have encouraged candidates to consolidate support within their own parties and then seek to attract independents. In the coalition-building process, the absence of intraparty factions requires candidates to negotiate directly with individual councilors, both within and across party lines. This often includes forming joint candidacies with influential independent councilors in order to secure the support of independent voting blocs. Because vote buying is costly, winning coalitions are generally maintained near the size of a minimal winning coalition, although candidates typically secure several additional supporters to reduce the risk of defections. Moreover, speaker elections involve a relatively small electorate and rarely entail cross-party vote buying, thereby lowering the likelihood of legal sanctions. Finally, the study examines the role of councilors’ business backgrounds. Given the substantial costs of vote-buying, councilors with ties to the construction industry possess the financial advantages necessary to compete for the speakership. Furthermore, because these business networks tend to be stable over time, the same individuals frequently retain the speakership across multiple consecutive terms.

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