Democratization in Taiwan has demanded a more delicate governance system Traditionally isolated administrative body is now encountered pluralistic interference that usually politicizes the policy process essentially. Public administrators, rather than simply rule the public, are now required to design institutions to work with the public in offering public goods. In this paper, I argue that traditional supply-side policies of waste management--mainly governmental provision of incinerators and landfills--have encountered considerable challenges of NIMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome. The governments eventually recognized that demand-side policies, thought administratively sophisticate and costly, are politically more feasible. Different levels of governments have therefore engaged in designing germane institutions to change citizens'behaviors in consumption and disposal of wastes. After briefly discussion on the possible public-private synergy in such recycling policies, this paper examines citizens' incentives of participating in such collective action in co-producing public goods (of managing the wastes), and explains why some townships might have performed better in recycling materials than others. In conclusion, this paper suggests that the government should remain such market mechanisms as deposit system even under energetic rent-seeking pressure from the business, because these mechanisms contribute to a successful application of all major incentives for public goods coproduction.