This paper based on A. Downs’ Median Voter Theorem, explores Chen Shui-Bian’s Third-way policy in unification-independence issue during the 2000 presidential election. The character of the empirical framework, based on the probability voter model proposed by Adams and Merrill (1999), is to incorporate both policies’ proximal and directional effects and to integrate the non-policy influence into the electoral decision. According to the Conditional Logit analysis, the paper has the flowing observations. First, the median voters who do not have distinct unification-independence preferences do not support the pan-blue sturdily as usual. They are more likely to vote for Chen. Second, unlike the pan-green tradition, Chen personally is able to attract the voters that prefer the unification if Chen moves towards the neutral point, given that he might lose some votes of the independence extremists. Third, people who prefer maintaining the status quo do not change their electoral decision much corresponding to Chen’s Third-way policy. Fourth, comparing with Lian, Song is less affected by Chen’s policy. Finally, this paper also convinces the influence of directional theory by finding Chen’s optimal location is either in the medial or in the extreme positions.